Down the Tube

Diplomacy and cooperation are necessary if humanity is to survive.

“There’s a notion that Russia will be somehow be ostracized going forward. We’ll all go down the tube if that happens—the main problems in the world are global and have no boundaries, so we’ll either solve these problems together or these problems won’t be solved.”

I’ve written previously that Washington is dragging out the war in Ukraine, that it’s immoral to drag out the war in Ukraine, and that it’s harmful to Ukraine to drag out the war in Ukraine. And I’ve also written previously about the decades-long background to the war in Ukraine—Washington provoked Putin’s heinous and idiotic act of criminal aggression.

Some people might be confused about the assertion that Washington is blocking diplomacy—these people should check out my interview with Anatol Lieven that explains where I’m coming from when I make that assertion.

Washington adamantly opposes diplomacy. And Washington is dragging Europe along with Washington’s opposition to diplomacy.

Hardliners evidently think that dragging out the war is good for Ukraine—the idea is that clobbering Russia on the battlefield will give the Ukrainians a better position at the negotiating table. But hardliners should look at what’s actually happening to Ukraine—I took the following notes on a 30 July 2022 NYT piece:

• “They have handed out Russian passports, cellphone numbers and set-top boxes for watching Russian television.”

• “They have replaced Ukrainian currency with the ruble, rerouted the internet through Russian servers and arrested hundreds who have resisted assimilation.”

• “In ways big and small, the occupying authorities on territory seized by Moscow’s forces are using fear and indoctrination to compel Ukrainians to adopt a Russian way of life.”

• “Russia-appointed administrators in towns, villages and cities like Kherson in Ukraine’s south are setting the stage for a vote as early as September that the Kremlin will present as a popular desire in the region to become part of Russia.”

• “They are recruiting pro-Russia locals for new ‘election commissions’ and promoting to Ukrainian civilians the putative benefits of joining their country; they are even reportedly printing the ballots already.”

• “Any referendum would be totally illegitimate, Ukrainian and Western officials say, but it would carry ominous consequences.”

• “Analysts both in Moscow and Ukraine expect that it would serve as a prelude to Mr. Putin’s officially declaring the conquered area to be Russian territory, protected by Russian nuclear weapons—making future attempts by Kyiv to drive out Russian forces potentially much more costly.”

• “Annexation would also represent Europe’s biggest territorial expansion by force since World War II, affecting an area several times larger than Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula that Mr. Putin took over in 2014.”

• “Kherson is one of four regions in which officials are signaling planned referendums, along with Zaporizhzhia in the south and Luhansk and Donetsk in the east.”

So it’s evident that dragging out the war just means allowing the Kremlin to sink its hooks deeper and deeper into Ukraine—it’s not clear how allowing that to happen is a good idea for Ukraine. Russia is entrenching its rule—that’s the predictable consequence of rejecting diplomacy and dragging the war out.

And as for the war’s toll on the world’s poor, nobody knows how many have died—there’s a disturbing 10 July 2022 WSJ piece about the horrors.

Regarding simplistic Western propaganda that doesn’t line up with what you’ll hear from knowledgeable people, I took the following notes on an interesting 9 May 2022 piece from John Quigley:

• “As the war in Ukraine continues to take thousands of lives, distressingly little attention is being devoted to bringing it to an end.”

• the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) recognized in the 1990s that “the existence of clusters of Russian speakers in newly independent states on Russia’s periphery was a recipe for conflict”—the “situation was reminiscent of how the stranding of populations of German speakers after the World War I collapse of the German and Austrian empires helped bring about World War II”

• these “Russians were the object of resentment as adherents of a formerly unwelcome ruler just as the Germans had been”—the “Conference began quiet efforts in preventive diplomacy, to convince the newly independent states to treat their Russian populations fairly”

• “Crimea was a particular focus of the Conference’s attention”—the US State Department appointed Quigley as an “‘expert on constitutional matters’ to ‘facilitate the dialogue between the Central Government and Crimean authorities concerning the autonomous status of the Republic of Crimea within Ukraine’”

• “Crimea fell under Ukrainian sovereignty, but its population was majority Russian and saw no reason to be part of Ukraine”—in “meetings with Crimean authorities”, Quigley “was confronted with claims for independence based on self-determination”

• Quigley “tried to find a way for the Ukrainian government to give enough autonomy that the Crimeans would stop demanding separation”—Quigley participated in “a series of meetings with Ukrainian and Crimean officials” after which Quigley “devised a plan for full-throated autonomy for Crimea, as a treaty that could have been concluded between Ukraine and Crimea” and that the CSCE would oversee internationally

• Quigley’s “treaty went nowhere”—the “CSCE High Commissioner for Minorities” told Quigley that “the Ukrainian government would not abide international oversight”

• “the CSCE was not prepared to pressure the Ukraine government on the matter”—“Ukraine cracked down on the Crimean Republic, and the conflict remained unresolved”

• tension “simmered until 2014, by which time Russia was prepared to act to take Crimea back”—“Crimea was then formally merged into the Russian Federation”

• a “similar ethnic dynamic developed in the Donbas”—regarding the Donbas, “the sentiment on the part of the Russian speaking population was less for separation from Ukraine than for autonomy”

• regarding the Donbas, Russia will have the opportunity to “say that the aim of its invasion has been accomplished” if “Ukraine does anything even close to implementing the Minsk agreement” that Germany and France and the US brokered in 2014—any “potential deal could be sweetened for Russia if Ukraine were to show flexibility on the status of Crimea”

• “Ukraine is unlikely to get Crimea back, no matter how Russia’s war plays out”

• as “for the Donbas, it would not be difficult for Ukraine to offer more autonomy than it has to date”—a “renewed Ukrainian commitment on autonomy could be framed by the Russian government as a victory”

• regarding the Donbas, the demands might be weaker than before—the “Russian military assault seems to have pushed many Russian speakers in the Donbas to embrace Ukraine”

• “Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s claim that the West is viewing the conflict as a proxy war against Russia cannot be lightly dismissed”—“Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has set a long-term aim of weakening Russia”

• it’s “reasonable to question whether the U.S. goal is less to force Russia out of Ukraine than to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian”

So you can see that Quigley’s account of things is very different from the simplistic fairy story that you hear in Western propaganda.

Wars generate extreme wartime hysteria. And extreme wartime hysteria makes it exceedingly hard to inject rationality and nuance into the discussion, but you can’t give up—there’s too much at stake.

There’s a notion that Russia will be somehow be ostracized going forward. We’ll all go down the tube if that happens—the main problems in the world are global and have no boundaries, so we’ll either solve these problems together or these problems won’t be solved.