Hawkish
There's a lot to criticize when it comes to the Biden administration's foreign policy.
I want to use this piece to draw attention to two commentaries—Anatol Lieven’s 8 November 2022 Time piece and Noam Chomsky’s 16 November 2022 Truthout piece—that discuss the Biden administration’s foreign policy. I wrote previously—on 23 September 2022—about the various grave dangers associated with the administration’s approach to the war in Ukraine.
Background Information
Lieven refers—in his commentary—to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2022:
The document says: “the post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next”; “people all over the world are struggling to cope with the effects” of shared cross-border problems; these problems are soluble only through cooperation; and we must face these problems in “a competitive international environment” that hinders cooperation.
He also refers to the Wolfowitz Doctrine. There’s an 8 March 1992 NYT piece about a classified document that had “been circulating at the highest levels of the Pentagon for weeks” and was “provided to The New York Times by an official who believes this post-cold-war strategy debate should be carried out in the public domain”—the document “makes the case for a world dominated by one superpower whose position can be perpetuated by constructive behavior and sufficient military might to deter any nation or group of nations from challenging American primacy”.
Chomsky refers—in his commentary—to a 1995 STRATCOM document:
The document says: “it hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed”; the “fact that some elements may appear to be potentially ‘out of control’ can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts within the minds of an adversary’s decision makers”; it “should be a part of the national persona we project to all adversaries” that “the US may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked”; “nuclear weapons always cast a shadow over any crisis or conflict in which the US is engaged”; and “deterrence through the threat of use of nuclear weapons will continue to be our top military strategy”.
And he refers to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2022:
The document says that the Biden administration “conducted a thorough review of a broad range of options for nuclear declaratory policy—including both No First Use and Sole Purpose policies—and concluded that those approaches would result in an unacceptable level of risk in light of the range of non-nuclear capabilities being developed and fielded by competitors that could inflict strategic-level damage to the United States and its Allies and partners”.
He refers to two 2021 remarks as well—one from a piece in Proceedings and one from a press briefing—that STRATCOM head Admiral Charles Richard made. The first remark is as follows: “We must acknowledge the foundational nature of our nation’s strategic nuclear forces, as they create the ‘maneuver space’ for us to project conventional military power strategically.” And the second remark is as follows: “I don’t have the luxury of deterring one country at a time, right? I have to deter all countries, all the time, in order to accomplish my mission sets.”
He refers—lastly—to the Clinton Doctrine. A 1999 Department of Defense report lists—among “U.S. vital national interests”—a need to ensure “uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources”:
The report warns that America will—when the “interests at stake are vital”—do “whatever it takes to defend them, including, when necessary, the unilateral use of military power”.
Chomsky’s 1 January 2005 piece observes: the 2002 W. Bush NSS “was widely criticized among the foreign-policy elite”; the Clinton Doctrine was “more expansive than Bush’s NSS”, but was “barely even reported”, since it was “presented with the right style” and “implemented less brazenly”; and the Clinton Doctrine “advocated ‘unilateral use of military power’ to defend vital interests, such as ‘ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies and strategic resources,’ without even the pretexts that Bush and Blair devised”.
Lieven’s Piece
Lieven writes that the Biden administration’s “strangely fearful” 2022 NSS is mostly “devoted to the dire threats to the U.S. and allied position in the world”. The supposed threats are Russia and China—there’s the “occasional glance at Iran and North Korea”.
The document misidentifies where the dangers are—the actual grave “dangers to the U.S.-led democratic West” are mainly either “internal to our societies” or “consequent on climate change”—and calls the climate threat “‘potentially existential’” even while “shockingly and entirely” downplaying it.
The “NSS misses what ought to be a blindingly obvious fact”—“America’s political and military position in the most important parts of the world” is “virtually unassailable by any outside power” if “the U.S. stands on the defensive on the basis of its existing alliance systems”.
The Russian army has—in Europe—“demonstrated conclusively that it is simply not capable of attacking NATO with any prospect of success”. Lieven asks whether “Russian troops that failed to capture Ukrainian cities 20 miles from the Russian border” can “threaten Warsaw, let alone Berlin”.
It “is sometimes argued that if a ceasefire is reached in Ukraine, the Russian government could successfully rebuild its forces to conquer the whole of Ukraine, or even threaten NATO”. Lieven points out that the West would—while the Russians did this—be “building up the Ukrainian forces” and “strengthening our own”. And asks why a Russian government would “think that a second war would stand any better chances than the first”.
Lieven questions how Russia is “supposed to create such formidable forces” when it “has a GDP barely one twentieth that of the U.S., E.U. and U.K. combined” and its “young men are flooding across Russia’s borders to escape military service”.
European societies’ “tremors of ease” have “little to do with fear of the Russian army”. One fear “stems precisely from fear of Russian military weakness”—the fear is that “the Ukrainian army might defeat Russia so thoroughly as to threaten the reconquest of Crimea and the naval base of Sevastopol, and that to prevent this Moscow would resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons”. The other fear “relates to energy shortages due to the cut-off of Russian gas supplies”—this fear is leading “to a desire for a ceasefire in Ukraine, not to calls for the abandonment of Ukraine, let alone submission to Russian hegemony in Europe”.
And the US has an alliance system—in East Asia—that’s “not as strong and all-encompassing as in Europe” but “quite strong enough to render absurd the idea of China expelling America from the region”. For “Beijing to invade Japan or Australia, or credibly threaten to do so, China would have first completely to eliminate the U.S. and Japanese navies, virtually ensuring in the process its own annihilation in a nuclear war”.
China remains—outside East Asia—“both much weaker and much more cautious than much U.S. commentary suggests”. China “has no strong and reliable allies in the region”—the US has “a military partnership with India”. China “has one small naval base (at Djibouti) in the Indian Ocean”—the US “has several giant ones”.
Taiwan is the “one great difference in military terms between the U.S. position in Europe and in East Asia”—it’s “increasingly hard for America to defend” Taiwan. It’s “an issue of immense military danger for America” if “America commits itself to the defense of Taiwan”, but Taiwan isn’t a formal US ally, so the US “is therefore not legally obligated to defend it”—the US “has every strategic interest in trying to reduce tension over Taiwan, and to continue by all possible means the ambiguity over Taiwan’s status that has maintained peace in recent generations”. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan “would be a gross crime against humanity and international legality” and “would probably strengthen, not weaken, the U.S. position and U.S. alliance system in Asia”.
Lieven says that he’s presented facts—about “the strengths of a U.S. defensive position” regarding Russia and China—that “cannot be seriously contested on the basis of objective evidence”. And asks what exactly “the U.S. foreign and security establishment” is “setting out to defend”. The answer “cannot very well be the U.S. alliance systems as they existed in 1988 or even in 2004, after the East European and Baltic States were admitted to NATO”—“these allies in themselves are secure against attack”.
Lieven writes that the US “foreign and security establishment has come to accept as its basic position the ‘Wolfowitz Doctrine’ of 1992”, which “sets out as the fundamental goal of U.S. strategy permanent American primacy, not only in the world as a whole, but in every region of the world”. Other states will have influence beyond their own borders only insofar as the US permits it—the US will also have to shape domestic systems and policies according to its wishes.
This doctrine has—in Europe—“led to the belief that NATO must be extended without limits into the former USSR, although a row of former U.S. diplomats, including the present director of the CIA, William Burns, warned that this would very likely lead to conflict with Russia”.
This doctrine means—in Africa and the Middle East—that “Russian influence must be opposed even when it is being used against Islamist extremists who are the common enemies of the West and Russia”. And means—in Africa—that “Chinese investment must be opposed even if it is strengthening the economies of faltering states whose collapse would threaten the interests of the West”.
And this doctrine means—in East Asia—that the US “must oppose China’s claims in the South China Sea while (in the NSS) committing itself to defend Japan’s claim to the uninhabited and strategically worthless Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, even though they were previously recognized by the U.S. as part of China and are also claimed by Taiwan in its capacity as the ‘Republic of China’”.
Lieven concludes that the NSS is prepared to risk American allies’ “very existence”—as well as America’s own—in “the name of defending U.S.-led democratic alliance systems that are not in fact threatened”.
The NSS is willing to take these existential risks for “places that are not actually U.S. allies”. And for “commitments that weaken, rather than strengthen, American interests and America’s position in the world”.
The NSS is willing to take these existential risks—and pursue these commitments—for “the sake of a universal U.S. primacy that has never been honestly presented to the American people as the purpose for which their taxes are being paid and their lives risked”—maybe “if asked a majority of Americans would say yes to this goal” but “the question should be put to them honestly and clearly”.
Chomsky’s Piece
Chomsky writes—regarding the war in Ukraine—that the “options for diplomacy have declined” as “the conflict has escalated”. And that it’s uncertain whether there’s “still an opportunity for the kind of diplomatic efforts that mainstream establishment voices are calling for”.
The US could—at minimum—“withdraw its insistence on sustaining the war to weaken Russia, thus barring the way to diplomacy”. Establishment voices call for something stronger—for “diplomatic options to be explored before the horrors become even worse, not only for Ukraine but far beyond”.
Chomsky says that “very mild liberal calls for considering a diplomatic option alongside of full support for Ukraine are at once subjected to a torrent of vilification”. He cites—to illustrate how these calls for considering diplomacy are sometimes quickly and fearfully withdrawn—a 25 October 2022 Guardian piece.
He points out that people in the mainstream establishment—who call for diplomacy—aren’t subjected to this treatment. He cites—to illustrate the how pro-diplomacy establishment voices aren’t vilified—a 2 November 2022 NYT piece titled “It’s Time to Bring Russia and Ukraine to the Negotiating Table” and a 28 October 2022 Foreign Affairs piece titled “Don’t Rule Out Diplomacy in Ukraine”.
Chomsky cites a 5 November 2022 WaPo piece titled “U.S. privately asks Ukraine to show it’s open to negotiate with Russia”. And says that concerns—about “a destructive war” and “increasingly ominous potential consequences”—might be “reaching the neocon war hawks who seem to be driving Biden’s foreign policy”.
Europe “is being badly hit by the cutoff of Russian supplies and the U.S.-initiated sanctions”—the “most dramatic hit to the European economy is the loss of cheap Russian gas”, while Russian minerals also “play an essential role in Europe’s industrial economy”. It “remains an open question whether European leaders will be willing to supervise Europe’s economic decline and increased subordination to the U.S.”. And “whether their populations will tolerate these outcomes of adhering to U.S. demands”.
Regarding nuclear weapons, Chomsky cites three pieces—a 27 October 2022 piece titled “Pentagon’s Strategy Won’t Rule Out Nuclear Use Against Non-Nuclear Threats”, then a 2022 piece titled “The Biden Nuclear Posture Review: Resetting the Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence”, and then a 28 October 2022 piece titled “‘A terrifying document’: Critics say Joe Biden’s nuclear policy makes the world more dangerous”.
Chomsky writes that it’s a “fair assessment” that the new NPR is “‘a terrifying document’” that “‘keeps the world on a path of increasing nuclear risk’” and increases—“‘in many ways’”—the nuclear risk. The danger was “already intolerably high” before the new NPR.
And Chomsky writes—in response to Admiral Charles Richard’s remarks that nuclear weapons provide “‘maneuver space’” and “‘deter all countries, all the time’”—that such a doctrine makes nuclear deterrence a “cover for conventional military operations around the globe”. As “Daniel Ellsberg put it, nuclear weapons are constantly used, just as a gun is used in a robbery even if it is not fired”.
This “doctrine is not very new”—the “documents have been public for decades and quoted in critical literature that is kept to the margins”.
A 1995 STRATCOM document says that “nuclear weapons must be constantly available because they ‘cast a shadow’ over conventional use of force”. And that the US should create a perception—one where the US is irrational and vindictive and where some US elements are uncontrollable—in order to “frighten those who might have thoughts of interfering”.
The 1995 document was “within the framework of the overarching Clinton doctrine that the U.S. must be ready to resort to force”—“multilaterally if we can, unilaterally if we must”—in order to “ensure ‘uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies and strategic resources’”.
>”adhering to U.S. demands”.
So the euros are supporting Ukraine only because we tell them to? Give them some credit. It’s not always about what we say.
Isn't it odd? The military is for diplomacy and the Secretary of State for war, regarding Ukraine.